Foreign Policy Between Revision and Expansion (Part B)
Source : K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship (London, 1971), pp.287-303.
Breakthrough into International Politics
The first great act of appeasement, namely the Anglo-German naval agreement of June, 1935, set in motion the momentous chain of events that prevented a possible anti-Hitler coalition and freed the Third Reich from the threat of isolation. Earlier, in the course of the disarmament talks, London had already shown a willingness to make changes and concessions. London took a more lenient view than Paris of a possible revision of the Versailles system, despite Germany's break with the League of Nations. French policy could ill afford to ignore this leniency, particularly in view of Britain's simultaneous efforts to withdraw from the problems of continental Europe and protect its own Rank. London apparently was willing to accept the consolidation of the National Socialist regime, its progressive rearmament, and the open violation of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
On March 16, 1935, Hitler risked another sudden move. He announced the institution of universal military service and the creation of an Air Force. This was the first overt blow against the principles of Versailles. While France and Italy tried to coordinate firm counter-moves and hoped to win Soviet support, London's response to Hitler's move was separate negotiations and a naval agreement apparently favorable to Great Britain. The situation was now completely changed. In violation of the decisions of the League of Nations and without informing France and Italy, both naval powers, London agreed to the fait accompli. Instead of applying sanctions against treaty violations; it rewarded Hitler's unilateral act by accepting him as a partner in negotiations, believing that he could be held in check by concessions, even though these shook the foundations of the Versailles system. Moreover, this first epochal act of appeasement, which spelled the beginning of the failure of European policy toward Hitler, also pulled the rug out from under those German diplomats who had been skeptical of Hitler's unilateral moves. It accelerated the rise of the subservient Ribbentrop, who had sat in on the London negotiations as envoy and now chalked them up as a personal success. And above all, Hitler felt himself confirmed in his belief that the time for bolder action had come, and that his success would not only help his revisionist plans but also serve to rally the German people. The revisionism of Weimar had become a thing of the past. Now unilateral moves and coups, threats and blackmail, had become the rule. The interrelation of the foreign and domestic policy of the total dictatorship became increasingly obvious. It is only fair to point out that the naval agreement, whose symbolic significance was incomparably greater than its actual contents, was intended not only to satisfy Great Britain's quest for security but also to commit the Third Reich to an agreement. London fell victim to the same illusions in the second event that agitated the European political scene and directly played into Hitler's hands ΓÇô the Ethiopian war. Mussolini's adventure shook the League of Nations and in the end forged a firm bond between Fascist Italy and the Third Reich. Here and in the Spanish Civil War, the basic constellation for the future war was taking shape. In addition to the continuation of a futile appeasement policy, only one other factor was needed to make the war Hitler wanted 'inevitable'; a temporary shielding off against Russia.
Even before the German-British agreement, Mussolini already had in mind the price he planned to demand for cooperating with the French in their policy to contain Germany: a free hand in Ethiopia. While plans for strengthening the security belt through Franco-Soviet and Czech-Soviet mutual assistance pacts progressed (May, 1935), the Duce believed the time had come to embark on a long-overdue imperial expansion. This broadening of mare nostrum imperialism to an anachronistic colonial imperialism was Mussolini's version of the land based Lebensraum imperialism of Hitler. (Yet five years later, in the first flush of success, Hitler, in carving up the British overseas empire, summarily decided that Central Africa was to become his, and North and East Africa were to go to, Italy 9 .) But with the Italian expansion, an alliance of mutual interests of the two latecomers against the established colonial powers began to take shape; the two dictators came together in their demand for territorial redistribution, for the political rectification of the nineteenth century. That Mussolini's appetite should he fixed on Ethiopia, which in 1923 was admitted to the League of Nations with Italian support, went back to the abortive attempt of 1893 to expand the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. The 'crisis' was provoked by staged border incidents. Mediation efforts by the French Government, which saw its alliance structure endangered, were of no avail. On the other hand, Hitler, extremely interested in heating up the conflict, secretly supported Ethiopia with arms. Paris and London were left with only one alternative to prevent international repercussions, particularly with regard to Germany: either to make a last-ditch effort to strengthen the League of Nations through determined action against the Fascist venture, or to tolerate it in the hope of tying Italy to a policy of European alliances that could deal with Hitler even without the League of Nations. Neither was done. That there were differences among the Western powers on Ethiopia as well as on the German problem soon became obvious. While Britain pushed for support of the League, France sought to prevent a conflict, which inevitably would present Hitler with fresh opportunities.
These differences gave Mussolini scope and time to prepare his war. Investigation committees, arbitration efforts, and British naval displays in the Mediterranean proved ineffective. Between October, 1935, and May, 1936, Italian troops, with incomparably superior forces and also with poison g, overcame the fierce resistance of Ethiopia. In effect, this victory meant the end of the League of Nations. Labeling Italy the aggressor and imposing economic sanctions not only proved inefficient but even accelerated the European consequences of the crisis: the loss of prestige of the two great democracies and of the League of Nations. Mussolini was able to claim a victory over 'fifty nations' and have his King proclaimed Emperor of Ethiopia, thus confirming the imperial idea of Fascism. There now existed a model for the future course of action of the dictators; and as early as 1936, the lifting of sanctions and acceptance of faits accomplis testified to the effectiveness of this policy.
The international political significance of this debacle lay in the fact that it helped the Third Reich to work its way out of isolation and embark on its strategy of alliances and war preparation. Though there had been great sympathy in Germany for the brave fight put up by Ethiopia, the war of sanctions was an economic windfall; at the same time, Italy's shift and the paralysis of the League of Nations presented Hitler with the opportunity for a new surprise move, which further strengthened his position at home and demonstrated anew the helplessness of the Western powers. On March 8, 1936, one year after instituting universal military service and creating an air force, Hitler used his tried and proved Blitz coup tactics to march into the demilitarized Rhineland. This was not only another blow against Versailles, but a clear violation of the Locarno Pact.
Again, the ability of a totalitarian regime to act quickly proved effective. The success of unilateral action was a persuasive answer to any existing misgivings of diplomats and military. At the same time, new opportunities were opened up for the now perfected plebiscitary self-approbation of the regime; the Reichstag 'elections' of March 29, 1936, were the first in which the totalitarian ideal figure of 99 per cent was reached ΓÇô or rather totaled up. The internal consolidation of totalitarian rule ΓÇô which, according to Hitler's ideas of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy, was the basis of his external strength ΓÇô had become an established fact. To be sure, none of these moves was devoid of propagandistic justifications. The reason given for the violation of the Locarno Treaty, which Hitler had specifically recognized only a short time before, was the ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact. Moreover, Hitler told the customary acclamatory special Reichstag session that he was ready to conclude non aggression pacts, along the lines of the German-Polish agreement, with France and Belgium as well as with his Eastern neighbors. Up to 1939, this was the tried method, after having broken agreements, of sugarcoating 'immutable' decisions with new promises and guarantees of peace. France above all had to react if the principle of lawful acts, not to mention the structure of the Versailles system, was to be saved. Again there were protests and public statements, and again no effort was made to trade concessions for reliable security guarantees. Great Britain was even less interested in taking action. Foreign Secretary Eden, though denouncing the German move, merely counseled moderation and the avoidance of further conflicts. A conference of the Locarno powers in London also protested the treaty violation but limited itself to an appeal to the International Court at The Hague and an agreement on guarantees.'
In a situation that held considerable dangers for its rearmament policy, the Third Reich had successfully taken another step on the road of revision through action and simultaneously on the road to the 're-organisation' of Europe. The last good chance to put a stop to this Hitlerian strategy had been missed. There may be disagreement over the possibilities then open to the Western powers, but there can be no dispute that at the time Italy was still preoccupied with its own pursuits, that the other Locarno powers were still united in their opposition to Hitler, and that Germany ΓÇô as the German military knew full well ΓÇô was not yet ready for a conflict. True, Hitler's sure instinct for the opportune moment was not the only factor in this preliminary test of strength. France was suffering from the after effects of years of economic crisis and was pressed by semi-fascist movements in the transition to a Popular Front government; the country was shaken by mass strikes, its military preparations were stagnating, the differences over the 'alternatives' of Communism and Fascism, reminiscent of the end of the Weimar Republic, confused public opinion on Germany, and the country concentrated its efforts on domestic problems. Meanwhile, the alleged superiority of the dictatorships over the democracies, with their waning prestige and internal conflicts, became increasingly evident, as was borne out by the next test that arose: the Spanish Civil War. In the course of this conflict, the almost involuntary cooperation of the two great dictatorships that had begun after the Ethiopian war was accelerated. Italy, eager to win recognition of its conquest, had taken part in the conference of Locarno powers, but now the temptation of testing its success in further actions was too great. Consequently, Mussolini, despite his misgivings over the power aspirations of the Third Reich, began to move closer to Hitler and his anti-status quo policies. In the meantime, the main obstacle to Italo-German cooperation ΓÇô German-Austrian tensions ΓÇô had also been removed with Papen's help. Although the joint statements issued by Berlin and Vienna on July 11, 1936, merely postponed the Anschluss problem, they nonetheless cleared the way for a German-Italian rapprochement. The start of the Spanish Civil War, set off after years of internal conflict by the Spanish-Moroccan Army revolt under the leadership of General Franco on July 17, 1936, accelerated this trend. The outcome of the bloody Spanish war that raged for almost three years expanded the dimensions and impact of the antidemocratic forces of Europe. Spain became the first great battlefield of the new political and ideological antagonists on which the system of Versailles and the power alliance supporting it were smothered.
Mussolini had lent support to the pro-fascist enemies of the Spanish Republic even before the outbreak of the civil war. In addition to the political and ideological factors motivating him, there was his hope that a change in government would improve Italy's position in the Mediterranean and vis-a-vis France. The French Popular Front Government, on the other hand, despite its sympathy for the Spanish Republic, pursued a course of non-intervention, supported by London and, for appearances' sake, also by Rome. This stand-by position in fact equated the Spanish rebels with the legal government. It soon also became apparent that the committee meeting in London to supervise the observance of non-intervention had as little authority and effect as the League of Nations' sanctions during the Ethiopian war the year before. Italy had no scruples about supplying the rebels with arms and even sending troops under the transparent guise of 'volunteers.' German help also began immediately, most strikingly in the form of the equally 'voluntary' Condor Legion, which distinguished itself in the bombing of Republican cities. On the other side, the Soviet Union tried to give the conflict a Communist coloration, and though it did not do quite as well, it did succeed in one vital respect: Franco now appeared as the savior of Spain from Communism, alongside those two other pioneers of anti-Bolshevism, Mussolini and Hitler. This strengthened Franco's position substantially, while Western assistance for the Republican side remained weak and ineffective. The Third Reich profited from the conflict in two ways: As a dress rehearsal for the coming war, the Spanish war offered new possibilities for both political and military development; and more important, the close co-operation with Italy on which Hitler's plans rested took concrete shape. The high point was reached with the formation of the 'Berlin-Rome Axis.' Mussolini had coined this term on November 1, 1936; it was also meant as an announcement of the claim to hegemonic rule by Italy and Germany, the two new European power centers. This 'axis,' around which the other countries would rotate, was to be the nucleus and crystallisation point of the new Europe between the 'decadent' democracies of the West and the Bolshevik danger. The major alliance of World War II was beginning to take shape.
Three major events of 1936 may thus be said to have been the signal points of the road into catastrophe: the violation of the Locarno treaty, Ethiopia, and Spain. Each of these gave evidence of the helpless acceptance of fascist aggressiveness. The European peace order had collapsed, even though the facade continued to stand for another three years. In view of Hitler's overt goals, a new general war appeared probable if not inevitable. The rapid pace of German rearmament could leave no doubt that the Third Reich would soon become a power to be reckoned with. Everything now depended on gauging the National Socialist course correctly. We know today from the wealth of documentary evidence that Hitler remained unalterably committed to an expansionist, aggressive Lebensraum philosophy. Such documentation was then not readily available, but millions of copies of Mein Kampf were circulating in Germany and accessible to the rest of the world, as were the proposals of Rosenberg and other top functionaries. The axioms of a national-imperialist, racist, totalitarian Weltanschauung, which the Third Reich had made into a universally valid principle were clearly spelled out. On many levels of domestic life, where the stumbling blocks of the transitional period had on the whole been removed, this ideology had become a terrible reality, most strikingly in the persecution of the Jews; step by step, the complete elimination and finally the extermination of that 'race' was becoming a fact.
It is true, foreign policy by comparison was still lagging; the consolidation of internal power and the total organisation and mobilisation of the human and material 'potential' took precedence. Only after this was achieved could foreign policy be tackled. But that this vital aspect of Nazi ideology would also be pursued consistently and ruthlessly should have been obvious to anyone familiar with the course of domestic affairs. The only question was whether National Socialism would be given opportunities similar to those it was afforded by the dissolution of the Weimar Republic and the capitulation of German society. There are astonishing parallels between the pre-1933 domestic policy of restraining Hitler and foreign appeasement after 1933, both in the illusions fostered and in their ultimate failure. And Hitler's skillful employment of the legality tactic encouraged the former as greatly as his tactic of peaceful revision did the latter. But at the same time the reverse side was always apparent, in the terror acts of the party and SA before and after 1933 as much as in the coups and treaty violations of Nazi foreign policy.
A crucial factor was the manner in which Hitler's policies were attuned to Britain's increasing readiness to lend a friendly ear to Germany's demands for revision. This considerably limited the scope of France, which in many respects was as rent by internal problems as Weimar had been. In addition, there was the persuasiveness of the 'bulwark' propaganda with which the National Socialists impressed leading circles throughout Europe. However unconvincing their claim to be the defenders of 'European culture' or even of capitalist society, there were those who considered them the lesser evil. As a result, the Soviet Union, despite its obvious receptivity, was excluded from the efforts to contain Hitler Germany. The immobility of France, the only country with good contacts with Moscow, confined the Soviet Union to a policy of suspicious waiting. No wonder therefore that this suspicion turned into profound mistrust after the Munich conference and ultimately influenced Stalin's decision to arrive at an arrangement with Hitler ΓÇô which turned out to be a major factor in unleashing the war.
The fact that the author of Mein Kampf and masterful wielder of totalitarian terror was not taken seriously soon enough, either in Germany or outside, whether West or East, vitally contributed to the success of National Socialist policy. By seeking to differentiate between ideology and politics, fantasy and reality, ultimate goals and existing possibilities, and betting on the 'good' or at least useful aspects of National Socialism ΓÇô anti-Communism in the one case, anti-Western interests in the other ΓÇô both West and East failed to see the interrelation of domestic and foreign policy, of dictatorship and expansion. In retrospect, the road to catastrophe, for Europe as well as for Germany, thus seems inevitable. This was true of the situation which had developed in 1936: an ineffective stand-by attitude on the part of Paris and London, the debacle of the League of Nations, successful unilateral action on the part of Italy, and the role of Spain as a battleground on which the victory of Fascist and Nazi intervention was taking shape. The ring of the French security treaties had been broken; the bilateral, isolating revision and agreements tactics of the Third Reich eroded and destroyed the multilateral peace and order principles of democratic Europe. The pull of success began to assert itself. Not only had the Versailles system, in need of major changes though it was, become a fiction, but international power relations became unsettled and unstable, with each country seeking to safeguard itself and harbouring doubts about the feasibility of a joint solution and the principle of collective security, which had so obviously failed in the face of power politics and the fait accompli. The two great dictatorships were the founders and masters of a new style. After the successes scored by them in 1935 ΓÇô 36, they began to acquire an aura of near invulnerability both at home and abroad. Two years later, they were imposing their will on Europe.
Throughout this period, the Third Reich, purposefully pursuing the postulates and visions of National Socialism, managed to catch up with Italy's lead and to gain the upper hand in the alliance. Hitler, showing far greater consistency than Mussolini, based his future policy on the realisation ΓÇô the wellspring of his highly touted 'intuition' ΓÇô that the West would not risk a war and bring its power to bear against judiciously applied blackmail, but, on the contrary, would retreat inch by inch. This was the experience of the past years, and it had also made the smaller states insecure and susceptible to the dual strategy of pressure and seduction. But in following this course, Hitler was not just being a Machiavellian tactician. He also held a conviction, almost like an article of faith, that the Western democracies were politically and racially decadent and ripe for decline. Here too the confluence of politics and ideology was apparently borne out by events. The policy of appeasement of 1937 ΓÇô 38 seemed to support Hitler. But later on ΓÇô first in the unexpected decision of the West not to let Poland down ΓÇô events also were to show to what extent ideological dogma can blind one to reality. This put an end to the strategy of the easy step-by-step achievement of individual expansionist goals, and finally the much-feared two-front war by which Hitler fell back on his original Lebensraum idea destroyed the Third Reich itself. And so in the end Hitler, by holding fast to his old, mad notions, foundered.
Preparing the Expansion
Three major stages mark the change on the international political scene by which the Third Reich, after five years of preparation, was given the opportunity to start on the road to expansion: the creation of the Berlin-Rome Axis, with increasingly adverse effects on the smaller states; the broadening of the European dictatorial alliance to include expansionist Japan the Anti-Comintern Pact; and, in the opposing camp, the continued retreat into appeasement and the isolation of the Soviet Union. In conjunction with this trend, German foreign policy was restructured, a process which institutionally found expression in the replacement of Neurath by the Nazi Ribbentrop, the counterpart to Mussolini's thirty-two-year-old son-in-law, Count Ciano. (Like the parvenu Ribbentrop, Ciano was not an 'old fighter' but had moved up from the directorship of the Fascist Propaganda Ministry to the head of the Italian Foreign Ministry, proudly noting that although it had taken Fascism fifteen years to capture the Foreign Ministry, it had now become the most Fascist of all ministries 10 .) Had it not been for this change, the foundation for the era of expansion could not have been laid so rapidly. The creation and broadening of the Axis played a decisive part in all of this. The Ethiopian war almost automatically had brought about a union of interest of the two expansionist dictators which until then, despite all political and ideological affinity, had not been forged. But now the reciprocal advantages of such an alliance made themselves felt: Italy's venture interfered with Western reaction to the violation of the Locarno treaty, just as the year before, Hitler's violation of the Versailles military provisions had interfered with the imposition of sanctions against Italy. The institutionalisation of the German-Italian alliance hence did not come as a surprise. What was surprising was that the rapprochement of the two related systems should have taken so long. Ethiopia, the Austrian agreement, and Spain ensured the priority of mutual interests over continuing conflicts of interest. And the fact that Hitler unreservedly recognised Italy's rights in the Southern Tyrol played a part as well. This was the only point on which the voelkisch principle was modified in favor of the alliance principle; the problem was to be solved, in good totalitarian fashion, through resettlement.
References:
10.Talks with Molotov in November, 1940; minutes in Alfred Seidl, Die Beziehungen zwischen D Deutschland und der Sowjetunion 1939ΓÇô1941 (Tuebingen, 1949), pp. 254 ff.
* As documented in a doctoral dissertation (Bonn) on the Ethiopian war, by Manfred Funke (to be published in 1970).ΓÇôK. D. B.
[Count] Ciano, Diario (Bologna, 1948), pp. 40, 55.
